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SUMMARIES 
This paper seeks to understand d'Alembert's critique 
of conventional probability theory in terms of a broader 
philosophical program aimed at achieving a closer match 
between mathematics and physical and psychological ex- 
perience. D'Alembert's discussions of the St. Peters- 
burg and inoculation problems are reinterpreted in light 
of this philosophical objective. 
Dans cet article, nous cherchons 3 comprendre la 
critique que fait d'A/embert de la theorie des probab.i- 
lit& conventfonnelle, et ceci, dans le cadre d'un 
programme philosophique &argi ayant pour but une 
meilleure adgquation entre la math&natique et l'expbri- 
ence physique et psychologique. La discussion par d'Alem- 
bert du paradoxe de St-Petersbourg et du problsme de 
l'inoculation est r&nterpr&t&e 2 la lumike de cet 
objectif philosophique. 
Although probability theory did not receive full analytical 
expression until Laplace's Thgorie Analytique des Probabilit& 
(18121, its elements had been established in the work of Pascal, 
Fermat, De Moivre, Huyghens, and Jacques Bernoulli and widely 
accepted by the European mathematical community by the first 
quarter of the eighteenth century. Hence, Jean de la Rond 
d'Alembert's (1717-1783) sharp and prolonged criticisms of the 
assumptions and definitions of probability theory have been 
viewed by most historians of mathematics as the aberrations of 
an otherwise outstanding mathematician. In this paper, I wish 
to show that d'Alembert's critique of conventional probability 
theory, far from being an isolated instance of perversity on 
the part of an extremely able mathematician, formed part of a 
much more extensive discussion of the relationships between 
mathematics and the world of both physical and psychological 
experience. D'Alembert's alternative formulations of probabili- 
ty theory sought to apply the inductive methods of the physical 
sciences to the determination of probability values, and to 
refine ordinary notions of mathematical expectations so as to 
take account of the so-called "moral" (i.e., social and psycho- 
logical) complexities of the problems, such as the desirability 
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of smallpox inoculations, assigned to the theory. Similarly 
d'Alembert attempted to incorporate standards of physical 
plausibility into probability theory in order to make it a more 
effective mathematical tool in the physical sciences. Through 
such adjustments, d'Alembert hoped to construct a theory of 
probability more closely modeled on the physical and psycho- 
logical realities of the situations to which the theory might 
be applied. 
D'Alembert's concern with the philosophical underpinnings 
of mathematics can be traced to his earliest scientific works, 
such as the Trait& de Dynamique (1743), and followed through- 
out his mathematical career. Almost every one of d'Alembert's 
scientific memoirs contained philosophical reflections on the 
nature of mathematical certainty, the origin of mathematical 
concepts, or the proper method of applying mathematics to 
natural philosophy. In his double role of mathematician and 
prominent philosophe, d'Alembert united a range of interests 
and talents which were exceptionally broad, even as judged by 
the catholic standards of the 18th century. D'Alembert ex- 
emplified his own spirited rebuttal to those who accused mathe- 
maticians of a narrow, provincial intellect which analyzed 
everything it touched to dryest dust. D'Alembert's counter- 
examples (and, it is fair to assume, personal models) were 
Descartes and Pascal, whose eloquence and philosophical acumen 
matched their mathematical proficiency [d'Alembert 1757, 6271. 
For his part, d'Alembert was thoroughly familiar with the 
works of Descartes, Locke, and Condillac, and synthesized ele- 
ments from the philosophies of all three into a distinctive 
view of mathematical knowledge which guided his approach to 
problems in mechanics, the calculus, and probability theory. 
A complete appreciation of d'Alembert's work in these areas 
presupposes an understanding of his philosophy of mathematics. 
The Lockean contribution to d'Alembert's philosophy of math- 
ematics is most striking in the "Preliminary Discourse" to the 
Encycfop6die. All human knowledge, d'Alembert asserts, derives 
from experience. Following Locke, he divides knowledge into 
two types: direct knowledge, resulting from immediate sensa- 
tion; and reflected knowledge, produced by the operations of 
the mind upon these direct ideas [d'Alembert 1963, 61. As a 
mathematician, d'Alembert is concerned almost exclusively with 
the latter, mediated form of knowledge. Borrowing from 
Descartes [Descartes 19551, d'Alembert assumes analysis to be 
the fundamental intellectual operation turned upon the raw 
materials of sensation. Property by property, the mind strips 
away the tangle of particular features which compose any sen- 
sation until it arrives at the barest skeleton or "phantom" 
[d'Alembert 1963, 191 of the object, shaped extension. 
It is at this rarefied level that mathematics studies the 
objects of experience. Although these objects have been sys- 
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tematically denuded of all those traits which normally accompany 
them in perception, they are not, d'Alembert insists, thereby 
denatured. Mathematics may be the "farthest outpost to which 
the contempleation of properties can lead us" [d'Alembert 1963, 
20-211, but it is nonetheless still anchored in the material 
universe of experience. For d'Alembert, mathematics is thus 
the most primitive of the empirical sciences. Primitive, that 
is, in the sense that its objects are the simplest, not in the 
intellectual maturity it requires. 
Once the limits of analysis have been reached at magnitude 
and extension, the mind reverses its path and begins to reconsti- 
tute perception, property by property, by the reciprocal opera- 
tion of synthesis, until it ultimately arrives at its departure 
point, the concrete experience itself. The successive stages 
along this route demarcate the subject matter of the various 
sciences. For example, add impenetrability and motion to the 
magnitude and extension of mathematics and the science of me- 
chanics is created. All sciences study the same objects, but 
embrace their perceptual complexity to a greater or lesser ex- 
tent. 
Although the reverse operation of synthesis recaptures the 
familiar aspects of our experience, increased complexity can 
only be purchased at the cost of decreased certainty. In 
d'Alembert's opinion, the source of the vaunted certainty of 
mathematics lay not in its axioms (which offer no prospect of 
intellectual advance, since they merely state the obvious), but 
in the simplicity of its subject matter. "Simplicity" is an 
elusive notion, with almost as many definitions as users, but 
d'Alembert fortunately makes his meaning unambiguous: The degree 
of simplicity is synonymous with the degree of abstraction. It 
is at this point in d'Alembert's philosophy of mathematics that 
the influence of Descartes makes itself felt most strongly. 
Simplicity insures certainty for d'Alembert because the sim- 
plest notions are "free of clouds and easy to grasp" [d'Alembert 
1796, i-ii]. By riveting the intellect upon clear and distinct 
ideas, errors due to confusion and faulty analogy are prevented. 
In a passage from the Trait6 de Dynamique (repeated almost ver- 
batim in the Discourse), d'Alembert argued that it was just those 
abstract concepts commonly considered to be the most inaccessi- 
ble which afforded the greatest illumination to the intellect, 
and conversely, "obscurity seems to take hold of our ideas to 
the extent that we examine more sensible properties in an object" 
[d'Alembert 1796, ii]. 
Yet d'Alembert insisted that such certainty be sacrificed 
to an understanding of nature as we experience it. The stream- 
lined shadow of that experience studied by mathematics was not 
sufficient in itself, although d'Alembert certainly appreciated 
the intellectual appeal of pure mathematics pursued for its own 
sake. However, mathematics must be applied to other realms to 
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earn its intellectual keep: Mathematical abstractions "are use- 
ful only insofar as we do not limit ourselves to them" [dIAlem- 
bert 1963, 211. While mathematics never leaves the domain of the 
empirical sciences entirely, the exclusive study of the two proper- 
ties of extension and magnitude severely limits its scope. 
D'Alembert consequently annexed a whole category of the sciences, 
dubbed "mixed mathematics", to mathematics proper in his System 
of Human Knowledge. Once again quoting from his own Trait6 de 
Dynamique, d'Alembert described a continuum of certainty in the 
sciences as a function of relative simplicity of subject matter. 
The common denominator for all subdivisions of mixed mathematics 
(which included optics and "geometric" astronomy as well as the 
theory of probability) was the study of quantity as it relates 
to diverse objects of experience [d'Alembert 1963, 152-541. 
However, d'Alembert was acutely aware of the abuses to which 
mixed mathematics might be subject. The practitioners of mixed 
mathematics must strike a balance between the degree of simplicity, 
and therefore abstraction, needed to achieve maximum certainty, 
and the degree of complexity, i.e., inclusion of experiential 
properties required for verisimilitude. On the one hand, the 
mixed mathematician must seek through abstraction the irreducible 
"simple ideas" from the complex ideas given by immediate sensa- 
tion. On the other hand, he must guard against the Cartesian 
error of mistaking an empty mathematical derivation for a genuine 
law of nature by incorporating a modicum of experiential data 
into his reasoning [d'Alembert 1821a, 138; 1796, xxvii]. This 
latter condition demanded that the mathematician not only subject 
his conclusions to the test of experience, but actually begin his 
formulation with an appropriate number of experientially-derived 
assumptions. 
D'Alembert's own scientific work might be viewed as a life- 
long exercise in mixed mathematics. All of his major works, and 
the vast majority of his memoirs, treat problems in applied mathe- 
matics, as their titles indicate: Trait& de Dynamique (1743); 
Trait& de 1'Equilibre et du Mouvement des Fluides (1744); R& 
cherches sur la Pr&ession des Equinoxes et sur la Nutation de 
la Terre (17491, to name only a few. D'Alembert's bias toward 
applied mathematics was certainly not unusual among the mathema- 
ticians of this period. With the exception of Euler, almost all 
of d'Alembert's colleagues concentrated on applied mathematical 
problems (although these researches frequently yielded valuable 
results for pure mathematics as well]. However, d'Alembert was 
exceptional in his Lockean demand that mathematics actually be 
modeled on, and ultimately derived from, experience. Pure mathe- 
matical researches in themselves are of limited value: Though 
total rigor may be admirable, it is ultimately empty. Pure 
mathematics deals with only a minuscule fraction of our experience; 
mixed mathematics, adroitly pursued Id'Alembert 1757, 6281, 
promised a natural philosophy worthy of the name. With these 
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arguments, d'Alembert hoped to silence two types of critics of 
mathematics: those who ridiculed it for studying objects which 
didn't exist; and those, especially "ignorant physicists," who 
dismissed it as a mere intellectual game of abstract hypotheses 
[d'Alembert 1821a, 2691. 
It was in this spirit that d'Alembert approached probability 
theory. His persistent criticisms of conventional probability 
theory should not be read as an expression of skepticism con- 
cerning either the possibility or desirability of such a theory, 
for he was enthusiastic about both. The "art of conjecture- 
analysis of chance" won a place within the mixed mathematics 
class of the sciences of nature. In an elaboration of his ency- 
clopedic scheme written after the Preliminary Discourse, d'Alem- 
bert praised this "art ofconjecture" as an essential, if neglected, 
science which was particularly useful in those cases, so fre- 
quent in physics, medicine, and jurisprudence, in which we must 
act in ignorance of all the relevant facts. It is this inherent 
imperfection of conjectural science, a chronic ignorance, which 
makes it the ideal field for the skilled mixed mathematician. 
The probabilist must be both totally versed in rigorous demon- 
stration and yet not restricted to it. He must be able to recog- 
nize not only the pure light of unalloyed truth, but also the 
gradations of more feeble rays beset by shadows. Above all, he 
must expose himself to a range of experience beyond "the austerity 
of mathematics" in order to "accustom himself to pass without 
difficulty from light to twilight" [d'Alembert 1821a, 1551. 
Conventional probability theory of d'Alembert's day was 
still a relatively young science. Building on the definitions 
and theorems advanced by Pascal, Fermat, De Moivre, Huyghens, 
and Jacques Bernoulli, mathematicians of the 18th century at- 
tempted to establish probability theory as a full-fledged branch 
of mathematics and to simultaneously enlarge the range of its 
applications. The treatise from which d'Alembert claimed to have 
learned probability theory and whose influence can be seen in his 
early Encyclopbdie articles on the subject [Yamazaki 1971, 60- 
611. Jacques Bernoulli's AL-S Conjectandi (published posthu- 
mously in 1713), epitomizes the state of the theory: Bernoulli 
offers definitions of equiprobability and Pascalian mathematical 
expectation, theorems for combining and estimating probabilities 
(including the first limit theorem to enter the theory, the so- 
called law of large numbers), applications to games of chance, 
and philosophical reflections. The proper scope of probability 
theory, especially with respect to problems in the social and 
psychological realm, became the point of greatest interest and 
controversy for 18th century mathematicians concerned with the 
theory, d'Alembert included. Among French probabilists, attempts 
to extend the domain of probability theory into philosophy (espe- 
cially the theory of knowledge) and the sciences of society can 
be found in works on the subject by Condorcet, Laplace, and 
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Poisson. Although these mathematicians did not, by and large 
shar'e d'Alembert's misgivings regarding the foundations of proba- 
bility theory, they did accept his premise that the success of 
new applications would depend upon the addition of new assump- 
tions drawn from experience within the proposed area of applica- 
tion. 
Reduced to their essentials, all of d'Alembert's criticisms 
of conventional probability theory concern its failure to pay 
adequate attention to experience in formulating its assumptions 
and definitions. D'Alembert subdivided probability theory into 
three parts which corresponded to its principal fields of appli- 
cation: the analysis of probability as applied to games of 
chance; the extension of the theory to problems of "common life," 
such as life expectancy, maritime insurance, and inoculation; and 
finally, the realm of true conjecture where mathematics had yet 
to make any inroads at all, in physics, history, medicine, juris- 
prudence, and "worldly science" (defined as the art of conauct- 
ing human affairs so as to maximize commercial advantage without 
violating moral precepts). These divisions are also ranked in 
order of descending certainty. Although d.'Alembert voices re- 
servations concerning certain results of conventional probability 
theory as applied to games of chance, he is nonetheless sure that 
its subject matter is intrinsically the simplest of the theory's 
potential applications, since the ordinary rules of mathematical 
combination usually suffice to enumerate all possible cases. In 
problems concerning common life, however, "experience and observa- 
tion alone can instruct us regarding the number of these cases, 
and then only approximately" [d'Alembert 1821a, 157-1581. 
Yet these problems still fall within the compass of mixed 
mathematics, as long as the facts which are to serve as "prin- 
ciples" or assumptions in the calculations are chosen judiciously. 
The third class of problems, which lacks both the requisite facts 
and method for mathematical treatment, does not enter into d'Alem- 
bert's critique of probability theory. D'Alembert intended his 
criticisms or clarifications of vaguely formulated definitions 
as constructive suggestions for probability theory as it then 
existed, not as a reproach for the many problems which had so 
far failed to surrender to the theory. By insisting that the 
simplest parts of the theory be perfected before progressing to 
more complex topics, d'Alembert remained true to his own dictum 
that the operation of synthesis must retrace the path of analysis 
one step at a time. 
D'Alembert's critique of the results of probability theory 
as applied to games of chance and other physical problems appears 
in its earliest form (circa 1754) in the relevant articles of the 
Encyclop&ie, beginning with the article on the coin game "Croix 
ou Pile" [Z]. This article contains the most explicit arguments 
against conventional probability theory among the Encyclop&die 
pieces, and foreshadows many of d'Alembert's later criticisms. 
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In this and other memoirs on the subject, d'Alembert shows him- 
self to be thoroughly conversant with the conventional theory. 
However, he is willing to challenge even the most elementary 
results of the theory (yamazaki 1971, Part I) in order to drama- 
tize his contention that the conventional theory had omitted 
crucial experiential elements of the problem situation. For 
d'Alembert, the St. Petersburg problem, as discussed by Daniel 
Bernoulli in the Memoires of the Academy of St. Petersburg 
[1730-1731; published 1738, Vol. 51 131, served to highlight the 
flaws of conventional probability theory as it was customarily 
applied to games of chance and more important problems in physics. 
Although d'alembert attached little or no significance to the 
solution of the problem itself, a rather minor one in the annals 
of gambling, he introduces it at the very outset of his discus- 
sion of the shortcomings of probability theory in the "Croix ou 
Pile" article, and returned to it over and over again in the 
following 25 years as the best single illustration of the con- 
ventional theory's neglect of relevant aspects of physical ex- 
perience. 
The problem itself involves a coin-toss game with two players, 
A and B. A tosses a coin: if heads (H) 141 occurs on the first 
toss, B pays A $1; If H doesn't occur until the second toss, A 
receives $2; the third toss, $4; etc. According to conventional 
probability theory, A's expectation (and therefore the stake 
which A must pay B in order to play the game) is the sum: 
12 4 p-1 
- + - + - +...+ -+ . . . 
2 4 8 2" 
Since the number of tosses is unspecified (the game ends only 
when A tosses an H), n could approach infinity, thereby making 
the expectation and the stake infinite as well. However, as 
Bernoulli and d'Alembert were both quick to point out, no sane 
person would pay even a small amount to play such a game. In 
this conflict between mathematics and common experience, d'Alem- 
bert consistently and unequivocally sided with common experience. 
Probability theory must explain, not dictate, prudent human 
action involving uncertainty. 
In the "Croix ou Pile" article, d'Alembert reviewed the 
various solutions which had been proposed to the St. Petersburg 
problem. To those who claimed that the series was not truly 
infinite but only indefinite, d'Alembert countered with his 
definition of infinity as a quantity greater than any given 
quantity,whichhad served him so well in his discussion of the 
calculus. Moreover, even if the game were limited to some large 
number of tosses n for the sake of practicality, d'Alembert argued 
that it would still be difficult to persuade anyone but a moron 
to play for a stake of n/2. 
Daniel Bernoulli's own suggested solution was based on the 
concept of moral expectation: A can only wager his available 
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capital and no more; thus the expectation and the stake remain 
finite. D'Alembert rejected Bernoulli's solution on two grounds. 
First, it does not obviate the problem that prudent people would 
be reluctant to play the game under almost any circumstances, 
much less stake their entire fortune on its outcome. Second, the 
notion of moral expectation, which weighs expected gains and los- 
ses against the player's available capital, .had been arbitrarily 
simplified and arbitrarily applied. One might easily imagine 
other factors besides wealth regarding the personal circumstances 
of the players that could also be plausibly included in the 
problem, such as state of mind, but which are prohibitively dif- 
ficult to quantify. More importantly, all other problems of 
mathematical expectation as ordinarily treated by probability 
theory take no account of any form of moral expectation, even 
the financial status of the players. Why d'Alembert queried, 
should an ad hoc exception to these rules be made for a particular 
problem? In a tone reminiscent of his analysis of the inconsisten- 
cies of the calculus, d'Alembert concluded his discussion of the 
St. Petersburg problem with an appeal to mathematicians to rid 
themselves of this "scandal" [d'Alembert 1757, 512-5131. 
The St. Petersburg problem became the leitmotif of d'Alem- 
bert's critique of conventional probability theory. In sub- 
sequent memoirs contained in his Opuscules Math&matiques [dIAlem- 
bert 1761, 1768, 17801, d'Alembert used this paradox as a tool 
with which to sharpen the contradictions he found within the 
accepted theory of probability, and to define the proper rela- 
tions of probability theory to experience. Since the points 
raised in these papers overlap to a large extent, I shall dis- 
cussed them jointly. D'Alernbert based his analysis of the St. 
Petersburg problem on a three-fold distinction between possibility, 
plausibility ("vraisemblable"), and probability. Possibility, in 
this context, refers to what d'Alembert alternately described as 
"metaphysical" or "mathematical" possibility, while plausibility 
denoted physical possibility. With respect to the St. Petersburg 
problem, it may be metaphysically possible that the outcome of 
some large number n tosses with a fair coin will all be tails 
(P=l/zn), but it is nonetheless physically implausible [dIAlem- 
bert 1780, 401. The conventional notion had, argued d'Alembert, 
confused these two types of possibility, the physical and the 
mathematical, by failing to take adequate notice of physical ex- 
perience in which a long consecutive sequence of identical events 
never happens purely by chance. Probabilists pay for this con- 
fusion in absurd results, like the infinite expectation computed 
for the St. Petersburg problem. 
D'Alembert characteristically defended his exclusion of the 
metaphysical possibility of n-tails-in-a-row by recourse to a 
model of physical reality. His discussion of this model and 
its implications for probability theory provide a striking ex- 
ample of the mixed mathematician's art of compromise between 
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the competing demands of abstraction and verisimilitude. D'Alem- 
bertsupposedthat there exist n different physical ways for 
heads (H) and tails (T) to occur given a fair coin, thus conced- 
ing initial equiprobability to the side of simplicity. Imagine 
that the outcome of the first toss is T: What will be the re- 
spective probabilities for H and T on the second toss? Since 
nature is overwhelmingly complex, d'Alembert argued, and because 
there are "causes continually acting to change their state at 
each instant" [d'Alembert 1780, 401, once one such physical route 
to a T outcome has been exhausted, there remain only n-l ways 
to obtain T, but H is still the endpoint of n possible routes. 
Therefore, concluded d'Alembert, H is marginally more probable 
(P(H)/P(T)= n/n -l)on the second toss. Even if n is infinite, 
implying that for any finite number m trials, n-m still is infi- 
nite so that H and T remain equiprobable, d'Alembert contended 
that as m increases, it becomes ever more likely ("vraisemblable") 
that the next toss will be found among the sequences yet to be 
executed. In short, probability theory must attend to our ex- 
perientially based conviction that no event in nature is ever 
duplicated exactly. 
To emphasize the relevance of this model of nature to prob- 
lems of the St. Petersburg genre, d'Alembert imagined a massive 
experiment in which 21°0 people each toss a fair coin 100 times, 
and then compare results. D'Alembert maintained that the all 
-H and all -T sequences will never occur, but that some of the 
mixed sequences will be repeated two or more times, thus ex- 
perimentally contradicting the prediction of conventional prob- 
ability theory of equiprobability (P=l/21°0) for any and all 
sequences. By including the merely metaphysical possibility of 
a uniform sequence on an equal footing with more physically plausi 
ble ones, d'Alembert claimed that the St. Petersburg problem 
was based upon manifestly (i.e., as tested by d'Alembert's 
thought experiments) false premisses. 
Although d'Alembert believed that conventional probability 
theory had erred on the side of oversimplification, he by no 
means despaired of salvaging the theory with suitable emenda- 
tions. A large part of his critical discussion of probability 
theory was devoted to recasting the assumptions and the defini- 
tions of the accepted theory into alternative mathematical form. 
For example,d'Alembert'smodified solution to the St. Petersburg 
problem consisted of constructing a series which would not only 
converge, but the value of whose terms also decreased continuously 
in accordance with the physical model described above. (D'Alem- 
bert rejected as simplistic Buffon's suggestion in the fourth 
volume of the Supplgment de 1'Histoire Naturelle that all proba- 
bilities less than 0.0001 be excluded as impossible, since it 
implied a discontinuous method of estimating probability values 
[d'Alembert 1780, 491). 
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D'Alembert's series estimated the value of each successive 
term separately: For the first toss, P(H)=P(T)=1/2; for the 
second toss, however, P (H)=l+a/2 and P (T)=l-a/2, assuming that 
the outcome of the first toss was T; for the third, P(TTH)= 
(l/2)(1-a/2)(l+a+b/2), where the limit of the sum a+b+c... is 
1 as the number of terms approaches infinity. Hence, for the 
St. Petersburg problem, the revised expectation would be: 
(1/2)[l+l+a +(1-a) (l+a+b)+(l-a) (l-a-b) (l+a+b+c)+...]. 
Since the term (l-a-b-c-.. .) ultimately approaches zero, the 
last factor estimating the value for an infinitely long sequence 
of H's or T's is also zero. D'Alembert explored other properties 
of the sum as well, such as relative rates of convergence 
[d'Alembert 1780, 581. Note that d'Alembert here not only re- 
jects the assumption of equiprobability but also that of the 
independence of consecutive coin tosses. Although d'Alembert 
admitted that his solution was not only cumbersome but also 
begged the question as to exactly how the small increments 
a,b,c,... were to be evaluated, he nontheless maintained that 
this revised version of probability theory was superior to the 
conventional formulation because of its greater verisimilitude, 
leaving it to other mathematicians to develop some reliable 
method for assigning such probabilities IS] Id'Alembert 1780, 
601. 
D'Alembert defended the principle behind his experiential 
solution to problems of the St. Petersburg family by pointing 
to areas in which probability theory had been modified to fit 
experience with great advantage, namely, in its application to 
life insurance schemes. While it is metaphysically conceiva- 
ble that 100 normal persons born in the same year might all die 
at age 30, experience contradicts this hypothesis, thus making 
the life insurance business a profitable concern. D'Alembert 
asked why, if the corrective of experience had been applied to 
probability in this case, should other physical situations 
(such as coin-tossing) be exempt? The testimony of experience 
is even stronger in the latter: No one has ever observed an 
identical event to happen many times in a row, unless there is 
some underlying uniform cause at work (such as a biassed coin). 
D'Alembert's interpretation of probability theory resembles 
Laplace's epistemological one [d'Alembert 1780, 49; Laplace 
1825, 3-41 but with a twist: For both mathematicians, prob- 
ability was subjective rather than objective, a measure of our 
ignorance rather than any true indeterminacy in nature. D'Alem- 
bert went further, however, and urged probabilists not to ex- 
aggerate the extent of out ignorance in those areas in which 
experience can be consulted: 
Our experience and understanding of the laws of nature 
teach us that the same event never happens many times in 
a row, and it is by virtue of this acquired knowledge 
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that we dismiss the repetition of "heads" or "tails" many 
times consecutively [d'Alembert 1780, 48; emphasis in the 
original]. 
For d'Alembert, probability theory was an outgrowth of the 
complexity of nature, which is such an intricate web of causes 
that the net effect appears chaotic to the limited human in- 
tellect. Just as the mixed mathematician must take care that 
his model of such situations is not belied by physical experi- 
ence, so he must also be able to distinguish those cases where 
an intelligible cause is indeed operative and where probability 
theory must give way to induction. If, for example, in the hun- 
dred coin-toss experiment, one player did toss a hundred tails 
in a row, he would be justified in wagering that the outcome of 
the 1Olst toss would also be tails, since some regular cause 
(e.g., the construction of the coin) was evidently at work 
Id'Alembert 1768, 901. In d'Alembert's opinion, Daniel 
Bernoulli's memoir on the origin of the solar system [Bernoulli 
17841 was just such a misapplication of probability theory. 
Reasoning from the astronomical observation that the orbital 
planes of all the known planets were all clustered within a few 
degrees of the plane of the ecliptic, and that, moreover, their 
directions of revolution were all the same, Bernoulli computed 
the probability of such an orderly arrangement resulting solely 
from the action of chance to be less than 10m6. Bernoulli con- 
cluded that the staggering large chance against such a coinci- 
dence demonstrated the common origin of the planets. 
While d'Alembert seconded Bernoulli's conclusion of a uni- 
form cause, and further remarked that such "coincidences" formed 
the basis for most fruitful scientific investigations, he pro- 
tested this application of probability theory to a case where 
the action of a single uniform cause was already evident [dIAlem 
bert 1821b, 4591. If Bernoulli had consistently applied con- 
ventional probability theory, he would have been forced to ad- 
mit that if the actual arrangement of the solar system was 
enormously improbable, so was any other given arrangement(just 
as in the case of the hundred coin-toss experiment, in which 
both the all-H/all-T sequences and any given mix of H and T 
have the identical probability l/2100). Since all combinations 
are metaphysically equiprobable (or in this case, equi-impro- 
bable), why, d'Alembert asked, search for a common cause in 
the one case but not in the other? D'Alembert argued that the 
orderly system of the planets did indeed point to a uniform 
cause, and that a hundred tails in a row would "also announce 
a cause" at work Id'Alembert 1768, 891: Neither situation 
would belong to the domain of probability theory any longer. 
The chance events treated by probability theory were not, 
in d'Alembert's mind, objectively random, but rather determined 
by so many distinct yet interwoven causes, or by so many differ- 
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ent causal routes terminating in the same effect, that no uni- 
form, regular cause was discernible to the human observer. In 
such cases, mixed mathematicians could rely on experience only 
to set the boundaries of physical possibility. However, if 
these boundaries were ever overstepped by an event of "extra- 
ordinary uniformity... outside the natural order" [d'Alembert 
1768, 901, the situation called for the method of induction, 
that is, the observation of regular causes, not the art of 
conjecture. Once again, acquired experience enables the mixed 
mathematician to make such distinctions. D'Alembert described 
a sequence of tiles, each imprinted with a letter of the alphabet, 
arranged in the combination "Constantinopolitanensibus." While 
someone ignorant of Latin and the existence of the city of 
Constantinople might regard the sequence as a result of sheer 
chance, a person knowing both would be convinced that the string 
of letters was the "work of an intelligent cause" [d'Alembert 
1780, 481. For d'Alembert, this conviction is completely anal- 
ogous to that which the well-informed mixed mathematician brings 
to the realm of natural phenomena. Probabilistic situations 
become inductive ones with the accumulation of experience, and 
even within probability theory refinements are possible as the 
limits of our knowledge recede. 
However intricate d'Alembert conceived the workings of the 
natural world to be, they hardly compared to the complexity of 
the moral world, or "common life." Consequently, the mixed 
mathematician who delves into the problems of the second branch 
of probability theory must be even more meticulous in matching 
mathematics to experience. In d'Alembert's discussions of this 
second part of the theory, the problem of inoculation plays much 
the same role that the St. Petersburg problem did for the first: 
It focused d'Alembert's reservations and objections on a concrete 
example upon which specific aspects of experience could be 
brought to bear. As in the case of the St. Petersburg problem, 
d'Alembert's point of departure was a memoir by Daniel Bernoulli, 
advancing a probabilistic interpretation of the relative ad- 
vantages and disadvantages of smallpox inoculation [Bernoulli 
17601. Unlike the St. Petersburg problem, however, the issue 
of inoculation was of urgent practical interest and hotly debated 
throughout Europe during the period 1750-1770, especially in 
France, where it became a pet crusade of the philosophes. 
In his memoir, Bernoulli argued that while the data on 
smallpox mortality was woefully deficient, one could still apply 
the theory of probability to the problem of inoculation on the 
assumption that "the simplest laws of nature are always the most 
plausible" [Bernoulli 1760, 61. Using the incomplete mortality 
tables and assuming that a smallpox victim's chance of dying 
from the disease was a constant regardless of age, Bernoulli 
derived an expression for the number of people likely to succumb 
to smallpox in a given time period and computed the average gain 
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in life expectancy from inoculation for any given age, In com- 
puting life expectancies, Bernoulli employed the formula anal- 
ogous to that of mathematical expectation for a lottery: the 
area under the curve of mortality (equivalent to the product of 
the number of gamblers and their stakes) divided by the number 
of living persons (the number of gamblers). Although Bernoulli 
refrained from endorsing inoculation explicitly, the favorable 
thrust of his analysis was unmistakable, as were the implica- 
tions of his request that La Condamine, the foremost French 
proponent of inoculation, consider Bernoulli's arguments 
[Bernoulli 1760, 52-531. 
In an introduction written five years after the original 
memoir was submitted to the Paris Academy of Sciences in 1760 
and appended to the published paper in 1766, Bernoulli defended 
his simplifying assumptions as consistent with, if not proven 
by, current medical knowledge of the disease and the admittedly 
incomplete tables of mortality. After all, Bernoulli argued, 
such agreement with phenomena as far as known was the only basis 
for belief in the universal law of gravitation. As for those 
critics whc missed the point of this lofty comparison, Bernoulli 
exhorted them to "take the trouble to apply themselves to the 
facts of the matters which they propose before making criticisms" 
[Bernoulli 1760, 3-71. 
There can be little doubt that Bernoulli had d'blembert in 
mind. D'Alembert had read a paper on the application of probabili- 
ty theory to the inoculation problem before a public session of 
the Academy of Sciences on November 12, 1760, which was a long 
and detailed critique of Bernoulli's memoir on the subject. The 
unidentified critic addressed in Bernoulli's introduction is 
described as a person of "merit and great reputation." Bernoulli 
and d'Alembert were lifelong rivals in mathematics [Hankins 1972, 
44-501, and Bernoulli was understandably piqued to see his memoir 
so harshly criticized by his old opponent in a public (versus 
academic) address before his own paper had been published [6]. 
On his side, d'Alembert was stung by Bernoulli's patronizing 
suggestion that d'Alembert apply himself to the "facts of the 
matter," since d'Alembert perceived attention to the facts of 
experience to be at the heart of his own alternative approach 
to probability theory. D'Alembert retorted that he was not sur- 
prised that those ignorant of analysis had prematurely attempted to 
compute the advantages of inoculation, but was indeed dismayed 
that they should count "a man such as M. Daniel Bernoulli" as 
one of their number [d'Alembert 1768, ix]. 
Personal animosity between the two mathematicians may have 
intensified the dispute over the inoculation problem, but it is 
difficult to ascribe d'Alembert's interest in the problem wholly 
to pugnacity. D'Alembert's criticism of Bernoulli's solution to 
the inoculation problem was entirely consistent with his criti- 
cisms of conventional probability theory's treatment of physical 
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problems, and ultimately rested on the same belief in the pri- 
macy of (in this case, psychological) experience. Moreover, 
d'Alembert risked his standing as a leading philosophe by op- 
posing Bernoulli on the inoculation issue, suggesting that his 
convictions on the subject went deeper than professional rival- 
ry- Voltaire had advocated inoculation in a chapter of his 
famous Lettres Philosophiques (Voltaire 1734), and by 1755, 
inoculation had become a central part of the philosophes' cam- 
paign for rational social reform against the reactionary forces 
of superstition. At the height of the controversy, inoculation 
became a favorite theme in popular French literature and almost 
a symbol of social and intellectual liberalism (Rowbotham 1935). 
Although d'Alembert took great pains to endorse inoculation and 
to discount the theological arguments mustered against it, his 
critique of Bernoulli's memoir must have been viewed by his 
fellow philosophes as an attempt to undermine the strongest 
arguments in favor of the procedure. 
D'Alembert's criticisms of Bernoulli's memoir have a familiar 
ring: His major objections take the conventional treatment of 
the problem to task for insufficient fidelity to relevant ex- 
perience. The conventional method of computing life expectan- 
cies, contended d'Alembert, ignored crucial distinctions. Im- 
agine two mortality curves AOCD and AQCD, which have identical 
integrals (Figure 1). According to Bernoulli's method, the 
average life expectancy is the same for both curves. However, 
d'Alembert asserts, the destinies of persons on the two curves 
differ significantly: AOCD is preferable since the number of 
deaths at an early age is less (d'Alembert 1768, 93). The con- 
FIGURE 1 
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ventional formula makes no provision for factors which are cri- 
tical from the standpoint of the individual. 
Similarly, in the inoculation problem, d'Alembert claimed 
that conventional probabilistic treatment neglected elements of 
psychological experience which were essential for evaluating the 
situation mathematically. Even if Bernoulli's assumption that 
the risk of dying from smallpox does not vary with age (d'Alem- 
bert was highly skeptical of this postulate and called for more 
detailed mortality tables to settle the question) were accepted, 
his solution did not, d'Alembert held, fully characterize the 
quandary of the person facing inoculation. The missing elements 
might be described as quality of life considerations: Is the 
risk for a 30 year-old, who might expect to live 30 more years 
naturally and 34 more years with inoculation, comparable to that 
of an older person who stands to gain the same increment in life 
expectancy? According to d'Alembert, the l/200 risk of dying 
from the inoculation itself in the prime of life must be balanced 
against the advantages of four more years added to the nether 
extreme of life, when one is less capable of enjoying them 
td'Alembert 1761, 33). 
For d'Alembert, the chief flaw of conventionally derived ex- 
pectations was their failure to coincide with psychological ex- 
pectation, i.e., "moral" experience. In this case, the gap be- 
tween mathematics and reality stemmed largely from the difficulty 
of balancing clear and present (although small) dangers such as 
inoculation against a greater risk of the disease itself spread 
out over a longer period. The integral of the mortality curve 
contains no information on where the curve dips and swells, but 
it is just such information which is of paramount importance to 
the individual. D'Alembert summarized his objections to Ber- 
noulli's method with an analogy drawn from the first branch of 
probability theory. He described a lottery in which all citi- 
zens were required to participate. After the drawing, half of 
the participants would immediately be put to death, while fortu- 
nate remainder would be guaranteed a lifespan of a hundred years. 
By conventional estimation, the average life expectancy of the 
entire population of newborns would be 50 years. Yet d'Alembert 
doubted whether anyone would voluntarily participate in such a 
lottery, even if the average life expectancy might ordinarily be 
less than 50 years. 
It is important to note that d'Alembert does not condone this 
form of reasoning which prefers large longterm risks to smaller, 
more immediate ones, which he called the "common logic...half 
good, half bad" [d'Alembert 1761, 351. However, he did despair 
of changing it. As in the case of the St. Petersburg problem, 
mixed mathematics must follow, not lead, common experience--in 
the inoculation problem, the actual psychology of risk-taking. 
Mathematics is descriptive, not normative [73. On a metaphysical 
plane, the conventional theory of probability could not be 
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faulted for its treatiment of either the inoculation or St. 
Petersburg problems. Yet both treatments, d'Alembert maintained, 
were irrelevant to our actual experience of the physical and 
moral worlds. 
D'Alembert deepened his critique of Bernoulli's solution of 
the inoculation problem by including still other aspects of moral 
experience. The advantages of inoculation must be judged with 
respect to three different types of life duration, according to 
d'Alembert: physical life or ordinary duration (the only type 
recognized in the accepted theory); "real life" or that portion 
of physical life which is lived fully, without suffering; and 
"civil life" or that portion of physical life in which one is 
useful to the state [d'Alembert 1761, 82-881. Depending on the 
vantage point chosen, the relative benefit to be derived from 
inoculation would vary widely, as d'Alembert demonstrated by 
constructing mortality curves for real and civil lifetimes. The 
slope of real life curves varied as a function of enjoyment, 
leveling off both in early childhood and old age; the curve of 
civil life dipped below the abcissa to represent those periods 
during which the individual is a ward of the state and therefore 
of negative utility. While d'Alembert was sensitive to the dif- 
ficulties of such estimations, which were certain to fluctuate 
'with individual circumstance, he nonetheless insisted that a 
sound probabilistic treatment of moral problems like inoculation 
could not afford to ignore them. D'Alembert's list of require- 
ments for a valid mathematical theory of inoculation was an ap- 
peal to experience at many levels: accurate mortality tables; 
a more sensitive method for computing life expectancies; a mathe- 
matical way of weighing small short-term risks against large 
long-term ones; a theory for comparing physical, real, and civil 
lifetimes. 
D'Alembert's critique of probability theory won few converts, 
although several of his contemporaries, notably Condorcet and 
Laplace, tacitly acknowledged the force of his arguments. While 
Condorcet never mentioned d'Alembert by name in any of his pub- 
lished probabilistic writings, his interest in the subject dates 
from an unpublished rebuttal defending d'Alembert's views on 
probability against Masse de la Rudeli&re's Dgfense de la Doctrine 
des Combinaisons... (1763) [Baker 1975, 176-1771 and Daniel Ber- 
noulli's tracts. A straight line can be drawn from this draft 
[Condorcet, MS 8831 in which Condorcet wrestles with "a com- 
mon measure that one can take in the calculus of probabilities," 
to his six-part early memoir on probability theory submitted to 
the Academy of Sciences between 1784 and 1787. D'Alembert's 
influence is most clearly shown in Condorcet's choice of problems, 
which address d'Alembert's gravest objections to the conventional 
theory. Condorcet's most notable effort in response to dIAlem- 
bert's critique was an attempt to redefine the Pascalian concept 
of mathematical expectation in terms of a "mean" rather than 
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"real" value [Condorcet 17841. 
Condorcet's frequently voiced philosophical reservations con- 
cerning the nature of the results obtained by means of probability 
theory also reveal his debt to d'Alembert. In an early draft 
[Baker 1975, 1781, Condorcet echoes d'Alembert's distinction be- 
tween an "abstract and metaphysical possibility" and a "physi- 
cal and real" one, and offers an example (significantly of the 
St. Petersburg type) to demonstrate that three equally valid 
methods result in three conflicting probability values for the 
same situation [Condorcet, us 875, 93-941. This early dis- 
tinction borrowed from d'Alembert formed the basis for Condorcet's 
later dichotomy between absolute, mathematical probabilities and 
"motivations for belief," the latter being based on actual ex- 
perience and therefore dictating conduct [Condorcet 1805, 90; 
Granger 1956, 1471. In his academic eulogy of d'Alembert and 
only published commentary on the latter's critique of probability 
theory, Condorcet assessed d'Alembert's contribution as a funda- 
mental one: 
. . . if this calculus of probabilities one day rests 
on more certain foundations, it will be to M. d'dlembert 
that we will be obliged [Condorcet~l847, 921. 
D'Alembert's influence on Laplace and other contemporary 
mathematicians was far more diffuse and is therefore more diffi- 
cult to interpret. Laplace's 1774 solution to the St. Petersburg 
problem, which postulated a physical inequality in the coin on 
the grounds that "the science of chance must be employed with 
caution, and must be modified when one passes from the mathema- 
tical to the physical case" [Laplace 17741, was very much in the 
spirit of d'Alembert's critique and enthusiastically received in 
the latter's Opuscules [d'Alembert 1780, 601. However, Laplace's 
1812 solution in the Thgorie Analytique des Probabilitks reverted 
to Daniel Bernoulli's moral expectation. Yet his reluctance to 
quantify the "infinity of circumstances particular to each indi- 
vidual which are impossible to evaluate" [Laplace 1847, 4821 is 
reminiscent of d'Alembert's earlier reluctance to embrace the 
notion of moral expectation. 
With the exception of Daniel Bernoulli, none of d'Alembert's 
contemporaries actually rejected his critique outright. Montucla, 
however, after describing d'Alembert's objections and judging 
them "plausible," observed that "they have not unsettled the 
generally accepted theory of probability in the minds of mathe- 
maticians in general" [Montucla 1802, 4061. The complexity 
which d'Alembert himself recognized as the major obstacle to the 
acceptance of his alternative formulations overshadowed the 
insightsthey contributed. D'Alembert offered many tentative re- 
workings of definitions and formalisms, but remained unsatisfied 
with all of them. In the work of Laplace, early 19th century 
probability theory continued on the path marked out by the ortho- 
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dox 18th century works of Jacques and Daniel Bernoulli. Although 
many concepts of 20th century decision theory resemble d'Alembert's 
concern with quantifying quality-of-life factors, the historical 
links between the two are tenuous or nonexistent. 
D'Alembert's criticisms have prompted a range of reactions 
from historians of probability theory. Some have dismissed them 
as absurd [Todhunter 1949, 2581; others have treated them as a 
curiosity [Maistrov 1974, 127-1281. A recent analysis has more 
sympathetically attemped to discover an internal, if faulty, 
logic to d'Alembert's critique, or to at least supply some con- 
sistent rationale for his objections [Yamazaki 1971, 601. At- 
tempts to understand d'Alembert's "eccentric" stance on proba- 
bility theory within the broader context of his scientific work 
have done so by emphasizing rationalist tendencies which would 
have made the very notion of a "science of uncertainty" suspect 
[Hankins 1972, 142-1491. This interpretation is belied by 
d'Alembert's own protest that he wished only to "amend and im- 
prove" the conventional theory. I have argued here that, far 
from calling for greater deductive rigor, d'Alembert's critique 
attacked the accepted theory's excessive reliance on the abstract, 
purely mathematical notions which he believed to offer certainty 
in human reasoning by screening out experience. 
Within the sphere of d'Alembert's philosophy of mathematics, 
his criticisms of probability theory are wholly intelligible. 
Committed to a mathematics which was experiential both in its 
origins and ultimate aims, d'Alembert sought to reconcile the 
claims of simplicity and verisimilitude in the two divisions of 
probability theory belonging to mixed mathematics. In doing so, 
he trusted his "esprit gQom&rique" [d'Alembert 17571 to set the 
optimal ratio of experience to abstraction, faulting conventional 
probability theory for its neglect of the former. D'Alembert's 
alternative formulations were thus part of the same mathematical 
program which proved so successful when applied to the calculus: 
to achieve a closer match between mathematics and experience 
[81. For d'Alembert, pure mathematics was not the culmination 
but only the starting point of natural philosophy. Mixed mathe- 
matics represented the first steps back to experience along the 
route of synthesis. Hence, it is not surprising that most of 
d'Alembert's scientific works subordinated pure to applied mathe- 
matics, and that d'Alembert, along with the majority of his con- 
temporaries, regarded the boundary between the two disciplines 
as a fluid one. In the case of probability theory, d'Alembert's 
allegiance to physical and psychological experience exacted too 
high a price in complexity. Modern probability theory has solved 
d'Alembert's dilemma by enforcing a three-fold division which 
divorces the pure mathematical theory from its application and 
both of these from ordinary experience [Feller 1957, l-31. For 
d'Alembert, an 18th century mathematician and philosophe steeped 
in the sensationalist philosophies of Locke and Condillac, how- 
ever, mathematics remained the original empirical science. 
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1. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
2. Encyclopgdie articles by d'Alembert relating to proba- 
bility theory include: "Absent," "Avantage, " "Bassette," 
"Carreau," "Combinaison," "Croix ou Pile," "Dg," "Lot&ie," 
and "ParG"; and in the Supplement, "Probl&me sur les cartes." 
The article on "Probabilite" was evidently written by Diderot. 
3. The problem was first proposed by Nikolaus Bernoulli I 
in a letter to Montmort, published in the latter's 1713 edition 
of Essai d'dnalyse sur les Jeux de Hasard. 
4. For the sake of convenience, I will translate "Croix" as 
"heads"; "pile“ as "tails"; and all currency as dollars. 
5. D'Alembert refers interested readers to Bayes' paper in 
the Philosophical Transactions (1763, published 1764) as com- 
municated by Price, and to Laplace's discussion of probabilities 
for a biassed coin [Laplace 17741. 
6. Bernoulli in fact complained of shabby treatment, par- 
ticularly in respect to publishing priority, to the Paris 
Academy of Sciences. D'Alembert replied at the meeting of 
December 7, 1762 (Archives de l'Acad6mie des Sciences, Dossier 
7 d&embre 1762), rebuking Bernoulli for his "injurious manner," 
and for having erected "great calculations on vague hypotheses 
in a matter concerning human life." 
7. Condorcet also believed that the results of probability 
theory should not contradict what "the simplest reasoning would 
have dictated" (Condorcet 1785, ii), but rather only clarify 
cases in which common sense ("bon sens") might be confused by 
sophistries. 
8. D'Alembert's reassessment of the foundations of the 
calculus in terms of the limit concept stemmed from his in- 
sistence that mathematical concepts both originate in experience 
and be mentally clear. A concept like infinity, as applied 
either to very large or very small magnitudes, had no genuine 
roots in experience and thus provided no departure point for 
the simplifying process of abstraction to work from. The in- 
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finitesimals of the calculus therefore "do not exist really 
either in nature, nor in the suppositions of mathematicians" 
and must be replaced with limit notions smaller than any given 
magnitude [d'Alembert 1789, 2081. 
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